The contrasting consumption behaviour of UK, US and Japanese households is examined in this paper through the lens of modernised Ando-Modgliani style consumption functions. Income growth expectations are treated systematically and income uncertainty and credit channel features are incorporated. These models therefore capture important parts of the financial accelerator. The evidence is that, since 1980, credit availability for UK and US but not Japanese households has undergone large shifts. Moreover, there is UK and US evidence both for a shift in the average consumption to income ratio as down-payment constraints eased, and for a shift in the collateral role of housing wealth as home equity loans became more freely available. Point estimates suggest the housing collateral effect is larger in the US than the UK, while land prices in Japan still have a negative effect on consumer spending. Together with evidence for negative real interest rate effects in the UK and US and positive ones in Japan, this suggests important differences in the transmission of monetary and credit shocks. 
Introduction
The global economic crisis of 2008-9 has its origins in a credit crisis. At the heart of a credit crisis is asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, most simply the fear that lenders have about the ability and willingness of borrowers to service their debts. It is now obvious to almost all observers that the household credit channel played an important part in the boom which preceded the crisis, as well as in accentuating the crisis which began in the sub-prime mortgage market. In a recent speech, the Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Donald Kohn criticized these models 1 :
"The recent experience indicates that we did not fully appreciate how financial innovation interacted with the channels of credit to affect real economic activity--both as credit and activity expanded and as they have contracted. In this regard, the macroeconomic models that have been used by central banks to inform their monetary policy decisions are clearly inadequate. These models incorporate few, if any, complex relationships among financial institutions or the financial-accelerator effects and other credit interactions that are now causing stresses in financial markets to spill over to the real economy.
Rather, these models abstract from institutional arrangements and focus on a few simple asset-arbitrage relationships, leaving them incapable of explaining recent developments in both credit volumes and risk premiums. Economists at central banks and in academia will need to devote much effort to overcoming these deficiencies in coming years."
At the present time, no ready-made model exists which fully captures the linkages and feedbacks shown in Figure 1 . This necessarily implies that work is needed on the individual elements of such a model without, initially at least, a general equilibrium solution. Two important equations are for house prices and for consumer spending. Elsewhere, we have modelled the critical role of shifts in credit supply in explaining house prices and of extrapolative expectations in the overshooting of house prices 2 . In this paper, we present estimates of consumption functions for three major economies in the tradition of Brumberg (1954, 1980) and Ando and Modigliani (1963) but more explicitly incorporating both income expectations and credit channel influences, the latter of which can differ across these countries and over time.
Our work in this area began with Murphy (1989, 1990 ) which explained the fall in the UK household saving ratio in partly in terms of UK credit market liberalisation and the increase both in house prices and in the 'spendability' of 1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20081112a.htm 2 Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) , Cameron et al. (2006) and Duca et al. (2008) .
housing and perhaps other illiquid wealth 3 . Our further research was summarized in Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995) which explained the foundations of a solved out consumption function encompassing both classical life-cycle/permanent income theory and credit channel features 4 . This and other related research have important implications for how the role of housing collateral in consumption decisions can differ across countries and structurally shift over time due to credit market liberalization.
In a perfect capital markets world, higher home prices will not affect non-housing consumption because higher home prices perfectly capitalize expectations of higher future rents. However, with imperfect capital markets, the price and availability of borrowing are affected by agency costs that give rise to down payment constraints in housing markets. Research by Japelli and Pagano (1994) and Englehardt (1996) and others has shown that mortgage down-payment constraints generate an economically significant motive to save. In countries with low access to consumer and mortgage credit, such as Japan and Italy, higher home prices can induce higher saving for downpayments, thereby generating negative consumption effects. Credit market liberalization can generate two positive effects on consumption that can lead to strong housing wealth effects, such as in the UK and the U.S. First, credit liberalization lowers the typical down-payment required of first-time home buyers. Second, it provides households who face constraints in unsecured credit markets a greater ability to borrow against housing equity at lower interest rates. It therefore seemed likely that the aggregate household saving ratio, conditional on income, income expectations, interest rates and household wealth, would fall with credit market liberalization. Aron and Muellbauer (2000) built this effect into an extended consumption function and provided estimates for South Africa of a jointly estimated two equation model for consumption and household debt demonstrating the importance of credit liberalisation.
Measuring the shift in the credit supply function facing households was the subject of several unpublished papers in the 1990s, culminating in the most systematic estimates to date in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) . In this paper, ten UK credit indicators were jointly modelled, controlling for standard economic and demographic variables, such as incomes, asset prices, interest rates, risk indicators 3 The comments by and , instead took the view that an exogenous shift in income growth expectations accounted for most of the fall in the saving ratio. 4 Although this paper had a notable influence on the consumption function of the Federal Reserve's FRB-US model and Brayton et al. (1997) devoted thorough attention to modeling expectations in FRB-US, the academic literature in macroeconomics has been dominated by approaches based on Euler equations with representative agents, as in many DSGE models.
and age composition of the population, to extract a latent variable, 5 the credit conditions index (CCI) interpreted as a scalar measure of the shift in credit supply facing households.
In Aron et al. (2008) , summarized in Muellbauer (2007) , we demonstrate that this credit supply shift had clearly significant effects on the consumption-to-income ratio, conditional on income, income expectations, changes in the unemployment rate, interest rates and household portfolios measured on quarterly data. Income growth expectations are modelled through an income forecasting equation. By interacting CCI with several other variables such as housing wealth, we provide evidence of other parameter shifts with credit market liberalisation, in line with theoretical priors.
Moreover, we showed that given these CCI effects, the other parameters of the model are stable over 1967-2005, and co-integration tests are passed with flying colours.
In Japan, credit market liberalization for households since the mid-1970s appears to have been largely absent. In Muellbauer and Murata (2008) , drawing on earlier work by Murata (1999) , we apply the same general consumption model to annual data for Japan for 1961 to 2006. Again income growth expectations are controlled for using a separate income forecasting equation. We find no evidence of any parameter shifts, confirmed by estimates of a constant-parameter equation for household debt. Co-integration tests for this consumption function are highly satisfactory and instrumental variables estimates suggest a remarkable absence of endogeneity bias. Consistent with this absence of credit market liberalization, we find that for Japan the housing wealth or collateral effect is negative, in contrast to the UK and US. Also, given the preponderance of liquid assets held by Japanese households, the aggregate effect of a rise in short-term real interest rates is positive, also in contrast with the UK and US.
Given this evidence, we turn to the U.S. consumption function, extending the very preliminary estimates in Muellbauer (2007) . In properly modelling the role of income expectations, we compare estimates of a U.S. income forecasting equation
with those for the UK and Japan. The long historical run of household survey data from the Michigan Survey allows our forecasting equation to be based more directly on household evidence than is possible for the other two countries. Nevertheless, there are interesting common factors and some differences between the three countries.
For the consumption function, we find strong evidence for structural shifts in the consumption-to-income ratio, conditional on income, income growth expectations, interest rates, unemployment changes, and portfolio holdings. These structural shifts plausibly link with changes in credit market architecture, particularly since the early 1980s. Our estimates suggest that co-integration of aggregate US consumption, income and portfolio holdings for the last forty years will be hard to find without taking account of these credit market shifts.
We have emphasised the necessarily partial equilibrium or conditional nature of these consumption and income forecasting equations. Nevertheless, they have powerful applications to short and medium term policy formation, particularly in the economic crisis of 2008-9, even without full articulation of the rest of the feedbacks illustrated in Figure 1 . For example, the UK estimates suggest that the housing collateral effect on consumer spending in recent years has been of the order of $3 for every $100 of variation in gross housing wealth, with about 80 percent of the effect experienced within four quarters. Taylor (2007) ) that the federal funds rate was kept too low for too long in this period.
Perhaps more importantly, there was an unusual and unsustainable liberalisation of the mortgage market that fuelled an unexpectedly strong credit, housing, and consumption boom, whose collapse is now playing out.
We conclude that although research of this type on aggregate time-series data has been deeply unfashionable in macroeconomics for the last two decades, it has crucial policy relevance. It also has a contribution to make in establishing some empirical considerations that may provide some guidance in the reconstruction of central bank models for which Donald Kohn, Charles Goodhart and others are calling.
Consumption Theory Background

Housing wealth effects.
We begin by demonstrating the weakness of the housing wealth effect in classical life-cycle theory. Let c = real non-housing consumption, Suppose expected relative house prices p h and the real interest rate r are constant.
Then the multi-period inter-temporal optimization problem is just a two-good problem with budget constraint: Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) , Friedman (1957 Friedman ( , 1963 and Ando and Modigliani (1963) . The simple implications of equation (2.2) are liable to be somewhat modified in models with finite lives and transactions costs and depend on how well imputed rent is measured in the national accounts. Nevertheless, it is hard to place much store on a substantial aggregate housing wealth effect from classical life-cycle permanent income theory.
The Household Credit Channel
This section discusses how access to credit interacts with house prices, interest rates and income growth expectations to influence consumption and how a change in access to credit changes consumption through two main mechanisms. In many countries, mortgage debt is the dominant household liability. The first mechanism concerns the mortgage down-payment constraint. Suppliers of mortgage credit set upper limits to loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios to reduce default risk. This forces young households to save for the initial deposit, i.e., to consume less than income, the difference depending on the ratio of house prices to income and on the minimum deposit as a fraction of the value of the house 6 . A reduction in credit constraints in the form of a reduction in the minimum deposit as a fraction of the value of the house, will raise the consumption of these households relative to income (see Japelli and Pagano (1994) and Deaton (1999) , and micro evidence in Engelhardt (1996) ).
Now consider the impact on consumption of higher house prices via the operation of the down-payment constraint. With weak access to credit, potential first-time buyers save more with higher house prices (unless they give up on house purchase). Increased access to credit will weaken the resulting negative effect on consumption of higher house prices.
Next, consider the second credit channel mechanism operating via housing collateral. In a number of countries, the relaxation of rules and spread of competition has made it easier to obtain loans backed by housing-equity (see Poterba and Manchester, 1989) . A rise in house prices then makes it possible to increase debt or to refinance other debt at the lower interest rates, given collateral backing.
Effectively, the liberalization of credit conditions increases the "spendability" or liquidity of such previously illiquid housing wealth. The greater liquidity of housing wealth, with easier access to credit, gives housing wealth a buffer stock role.
Overall, combining the down-payment and collateral mechanisms with the life-cycle view relevant for some households, if existing owners have only limited access to home equity loans, the effect on their consumption of higher house prices will be small. Taking equation (2.2) literally implies that existing owners, who are not credit constrained and whose behaviour is governed by the life-cycle model outlined above, will have a small negative response to a permanent increase in real house prices unless they downsize to cheaper accommodation. By life-cycle theory, renters save more with higher house prices, as is implied by equation (2.2) when H 0 is zero. Hence, given the above discussion of the down-payment constraint, the aggregate consumption effect of a rise in real house prices is likely to be negative when access to credit is restricted, but switches to positive as access to credit expands.
In countries like the UK where floating rate debt is important, indebted households are subject to short-term shocks to cash flows when nominal interest rates change, see Jackman and Sutton (1982) . Their consumption is thus likely to be influenced by changes in the debt service burden, which can be well represented by proportional changes in the nominal interest rate, weighted by the debt-to-income ratio. Better access to collateral will reduce the impact of such changes, as households with positive net equity can more easily refinance to protect cash flows against rises in nominal interest rates. The negative effect of nominal interest rate changes weighted by the debt-to-income ratio, should thus weaken with credit market liberalization, but become larger in a credit crunch.
Finally, greater access to unsecured credit should increase the role of intertemporal substitution, enhancing the role of income growth expectations and, on balance, making the real interest rate effect more negative.
Aggregation and the Incorporation of Demographic Effects
In stylized solved out life-cycle consumption functions where we proxy expected or 'permanent' income by current income, micro-level consumption is given by a linear function of assets and non-property income:
where i γ and i λ vary by age. Hence aggregate or average per capita consumption is: wanting to sustain consumption will realize that not all of assets can be spent now without damaging future consumption, and that future income has a bearing on sustainable consumption. As we shall see, practical applications of equation (2.5) capture these basic ideas.
Dividing equation (2.5) by y and a little manipulation gives:
The right-hand side of equation (2.5) has the form 1+ x, where x is usually a fairly small number. We can then take logs, using the fact that ( ) α embodies the evolving distribution of income and demography, while γ embodies the evolving relative influences of the asset and income distribution and demography. One might attempt to proxy the former by the inclusion of demographic variables such as the population proportions in different age groups. The log ratio of permanent to current income reflects expectations of income growth and in practice can be proxied by functions of forecasted income growth rates.
The difference between log permanent and log current income in (2.7) can be expressed as ( ) 
is defined as a weighted moving average of forward-looking income growth rates, see Campbell (1997) . To dynamise the static form of equation for instance to introduce habits or adjustment costs, implies a partial adjustment form of equation (2.5) or (2.7), see Muellbauer (1988) for a derivation.
Further, extending the model to probabilistic income expectations, suggests the introduction of a measure of income uncertainty, t θ and allows the discount factors in expected income growth, measured by
to incorporate a risk premium, allowing the possibility that households may discount the future more heavily than by the real rate of interest (see Hayashi, 1985) . If real interest rates are variable, standard theory suggests the real interest rate r t enters the model, with the usual interpretation of inter-temporal substitution and income effects.
This gives the following generalisation of the canonical REPIH model in equation (2.7):
where β measures the speed of adjustment. In principle, the coefficients 3 α and γ should depend upon the real interest rate, r t ; they should also depend on t θ , since discount factors applied to expected incomes will increase with income uncertainty, as Skinner (1988) , Zeldes (1989 ), and Carroll (1997 , 2001b have emphasized. For simplicity we will suppress this complication and the associated potential nonlinearities.
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In practice, there are a number of reasons why income growth expectations embodied in
are likely to reflect a limited horizon. With aggregate data it is difficult to forecast income beyond about three years. Indeed, widely used time series models have usually lost most of their forecasting power by then. This suggests that the log of income in the more distant future is best forecast in practice by near-term log-income plus a constant. Furthermore, shorter horizons are suggested if households anticipate future credit constraints according to the buffer-stock theory of saving (see Deaton 1991 Deaton , 1992 . Precautionary behaviour with uncertain 'worst case scenarios' also generates buffer-stock saving, as in Carroll (2001b) , who argues that plausible calibrations of micro-behaviour can give a practical income forecasting horizon of about three years -as Friedman (1957 Friedman ( , 1963 suggested.
The log formulation is very convenient with exponentially trending macro data, The time variation in some of the parameters induced by shifts in credit availability is discussed below. log
measures income growth expectations.
NLA/y is the ratio of liquid assets minus debt to non-property income, IFA/y is the ratio of illiquid financial assets to non-property income, HA/y is the ratio of housing wealth to non-property income;
( ) 
UK Results
Income-Forecasting Equations
The dependent variable in the income forecasting equation, yperm log ∆ , is defined as the difference between 'log permanent' and log current income given by (2.8), where the discount factor is 0.85 and the horizon k is 3 years, as originally suggested by Friedman (1963) , see Carroll (2001) for discussion. With a discount value of 0.85, truncating the geometric formula for permanent income after 12 quarters introduces only a slight approximation error. To forecast yperm log ∆ , we examined a range of alternative informational assumptions. At one extreme, we regress it simply on log y and its lags, which would be the reduced form of an AR process in log y. However, we allow for the possibility of longer lags by considering also 4 log y at lags of 4 and 8 quarters. The only significant lag is a negative effect at lag 8, suggesting some kind of reversion in growth rates, but this is not a very stable relationship. The next simplest is to introduce a trend and the level of log y. This suggests strong trend reversion, with some persistence in the annual growth rate, and fits better. A further extension is to introduce changes in interest rates to reflect the influence of monetary policy on growth and levels of real asset prices. Given the widely discussed potential of asset prices to be proxies for income growth expectations, see , , Attanasio and Weber (1994) , Poterba (2000) and Attanasio et al. (2006) , it is important that we control for this effect. Interestingly enough, the log real stock market index is not significant in this formulation and the log real house price index only begins to be relevant from 1981, after the advent of UK credit market liberalisation. The estimated equation with these elements is used to generate a 'naïve' forecast.
At the other extreme, we posit a long-run relationship for log y as a function of a linear trend (+), real interest rates (-), changes in nominal interest rates (-), the logs of real oil prices (-), share prices (+) and real house prices (+), the rate of tax on income (-), the rate of unionization (+) since greater union power should raise the share of labour income, and some national accounts ratios. These include the ratio of the government surplus to GDP where a higher ratio in the long run should allow lower tax rates or higher government spending, though offset in the short run by the negative 'Keynesian' effect of fiscal contraction, and the ratio of the trade deficit to GDP, since trade deficits have in the past constrained growth. However, there was a profound shift in fiscal policy around 1980, with the coming into power of the Thatcher government. This would be expected to have reinforced the positive role of the government surplus, and with the Burns-Lawson doctrine 8 , to have led to trade deficits no longer mattering for fiscal policy. We find strong evidence for both hypotheses by testing for interaction effects with pre and post 1980 dummies. We also test for a shift in the early 1980s in the role of real house prices, to be consistent with the shifting role of housing wealth in consumption with credit market liberalization. We confirm the absence of a positive real house price effect on income before the early 1980s, as in the 'naïve' model. We also checked for world growth and real exchange rate effects but failed to find stable relationships.
The long run level effects discussed all enter as 4-quarter moving averages, though for oil prices, the lags are even longer. Using a general-to-specific reduction procedure with HAC t-ratios and F-tests, we check for short run dynamics from changes in interest rates, where negative effects are confirmed, and growth rates of income and real oil and asset prices, in part to check for dynamic mi-specification due to the choice of 4-quarter moving average level effects. 
The Consumption Equation
We draw on Aron et al. (2008) to summarize key evidence for UK consumption. We begin by estimating our version of the text-book rational expectations permanent income model given by equation (2.10), with quarterly data.
Consumption refers to real per capita consumer spending, including durables. Income is real per capita non-property income. The net worth to income ratio is defined as liquid assets minus debt plus illiquid financial assets plus housing wealth, taken as the end of previous quarter levels, relative to current income.
--- Table 1 About Here ---
In Table 1 , column 1 shows the text-book REPIH model with habits, equation The additional variables are the change in the unemployment rate, a proxy for income insecurity, the real interest rate, the weighted change in nominal interest rates on debt, and a separate housing 'wealth' effect.
Though the real interest rate is insignificant, the other effects are all significant and the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth effect is apparently larger at 0.036 than out of illiquid financial assets at 0.023. Clearly, the superior fit of this model rejects the restrictions embodied in columns 1 and 2.
Finally, we show a specification in column 4 in which we allow the relevant parameters of equation (2.10) to shift with the UK index of credit conditions, CCI..
The expected shifts in parameters all occur, though some are insignificant. Overall, the improvement in fit is significant relative to column 3. We show a parsimonious version of the model. The housing wealth-to-income ratio is insignificant, while its interaction effect 11 with CCI is strongly significant, and so we omit the former. The marginal propensity to spend out of housing assets at the maximum value of CCI (normalized at 1) is 0.032, while that of illiquid financial assets is around 0.019, which, in turn, is far below that of net liquid assets, at around 0.11. These results for the housing assets effect are lower than many found in the literature. We find that a four-quarter moving average of observations on illiquid financial assets fits better than the end of previous quarter value, consistent with findings by Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) . 12 Since much of illiquid financial assets lies in pension funds, this plausibly reflects the slow adaptation of contribution and pay-out rates to changes in asset values.
The real interest rate effect is negative, but significant only at the 10 percent level. According to point estimates, not shown, the evidence is that it strengthens as CCI rises. The debt-weighted nominal interest rate change, also negative, weakens as CCI rises. With easier access to credit, inter-temporal substitution should play a bigger role, explaining, as noted above, the enhanced role for income growth expectations, for which there is also evidence here. Income uncertainty is represented by the four quarter change in the unemployment rate, which has a negative effect on consumption. The interaction effect with CCI is positive, but quite insignificant,
suggesting that higher debt levels may have offset the reduction in income uncertainty effects one might have expected from easier access to credit. The speed of adjustment is 0.33 meaning that 80 percent of the adjustment of consumption to income and the other explanatory variables is complete after four quarters.
The parameters of this equation are remarkably stable as the charts of recursive estimates shown in Aron et al. (2008) reveal. The model can be interpreted in terms of co-integrated variables. Effectively, the log ratio of consumption to nonproperty income and the three asset to income ratios form a co-integrated relationship between four I(1) variables, subject to a shift in the intercept via CCI. Since the real interest rate is arguably I(0) and in any case plays only a marginal role, we can neglect it here. We carried out a co-integration analysis, in which we treat CCI as an exogenous shift dummy, and include in the equation system I(0) variables such as income growth and forecast growth and the change in the unemployment rate and the impulse dummies, but outside the co-integration space. With a lag of two, there is only one co-integrating relationship and this is close to the long-run solution implied by the column 2 estimates. Effectively, this analysis treats current income growth and the forecast of future growth and the unemployment rate as weakly exogenous variables. Evidence for weak exogeneity is found from models for these I (0) variables in which the lagged equilibrium correction term implied by the cointegration vector is insignificant 13 . For the UK, therefore, the pessimism expressed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) and Carroll et al. (2006) for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between consumption, income and assets appears to be misplaced, at least once the CCI effect is included and assets are split into the three components indicated. holdings relative to income also played in important part in the upward trend in consumption relative to income. However, the rise in debt, reflected in the fall of net liquid assets relative to income seen in Figure 3 , has major offsetting effects in the long run 14 . The fact that the estimated marginal propensity to consume out of net liquid assets is substantially higher than that out of other assets is quite important here.
Much conventional discussion of wealth effects focuses on net worth and so misses the special role of liquidity and of debt. Figure 3 suggests that, as discussed in the 14 As Ed Lazear and William White noted at the 2007 Jackson Hole Symposium, if the house price effect on consumption is mainly a collateral effect, payback time has to come. This is reflected in Figure 3 .
Introduction, UK consumption levels are now quite vulnerable to downturns in asset prices, given that debt is hard to reduce in the short-run 15 .
Results for Japan
The income growth forecasting equations.
For Japan, we work with annual data. In practice, it made little difference whether we use the one year ahead growth rate of income, or a weighted average of up to three years ahead, to model ln( / ) P t t y y . Results are shown for the former. We follow a general to specific methodology in paring down a very general model to a parsimonious form. The general model includes a trend, a split trend from 1973 for the slowdown in Japanese growth which then occurred and the level of log real per capita income. Other variables include log US GDP, the log real exchange rate, log real oil prices, log real asset prices, the real interest rate, the change in the nominal interest rate, and the government surplus and debt to GDP ratios. Table 2 reports the parsimonious specifications found after testing down.
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--- Table 2 About Here ---There is strong evidence for reversion to the split growth trend and the 3-year moving average of government balance/GDP has a positive coefficient. The table also shows an alternative specification in which lags in the ratio of government debt to GDP replace government balance/GDP. The lagged government debt/GDP ratios have highly significant coefficients, negative in the long run, as shown in the last column in Table 3 . The US log GDP is also significant and real oil prices are then not significant, though they would be if US log GDP were omitted. The influence of the US as leading economy and key trading partner for Japan is thus confirmed. The change in nominal interest rates over the previous three years has a negative effect on next 15 Note that at mid-2007 illiquid financial assets relative to income were substantially above the 2005 ratio shown in Figure 3 , but have fallen sharply since. 16 With the help of Autometrics software, Doornik (2007) . Since the residuals reveal some heteroscedasticity, reflecting the greater volatility of pre-1975 growth, robust standard errors are reported year's household income growth, suggesting that, overall, monetary policy has some negative effect on growth. However, the real interest rate is insignificant, and positively signed. Columns 2 and 3 show the income forecasting equation fitted over alternative samples, showing remarkable parameter stability.
Results for Aggregate Consumption
Our aim is to estimate for Japan variants of equation (2.10) discussed in section 2. We use annual data from 1961 to 2006. In a slight modification, we also include the lagged log real land price. It quickly becomes apparent that the ratio of physical assets to income and the real land price have negative coefficients and we therefore report equations in which each is included separately. Further, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the marginal propensities to spend out of deposits and illiquid financial assets are the same, and are equal to minus the coefficient on household debt. This may be because "deposits" includes a substantial amount of longer term time deposits which are therefore not so liquid. At any rate, we can work with a net financial wealth, which is always very significant and with a long run MPC of around 0.05 to 0.07 (see Table 3 ).
--- Table 3 About Here ---
The income uncertainty indicators enter with the correct signs. The measure of income volatility is significant as shown in the first column of Table 3 . In the second column the cross term of income volatility and forecast income growth rate was added, as the theory discussed in Section 2 suggests that greater income uncertainty should lead to a bigger discount on expected growth. When both are included, the cross term was found to be significant while income volatility insignificant. The change in the unemployment rate is not significant at the 5% level, probably because of its more limited variability in Japan, in contrast to its far more significant role in the UK and the US. However, the sign is negative and the magnitude of the coefficient is not far below UK and US estimates.
The change in the nominal interest rate is always insignificant, unlike in the UK, but the level of the real rate has a strongly significant positive effect. This is not a disguised inflation effect as the inflation rate is insignificant when included, while the real rate remains significant. In Aron et al. (2008) and Muellbauer (2007) we find negative real interest rate effects in similar specifications estimated for the UK and the US.
Finally, the log change in income has a positive and significant effect. This is also in contrast to the UK and US findings, where this effect is not significant. The argument comes from applying the Campbell-Mankiw aggregation of credit constrained and unconstrained households to a solved out consumption function, see Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995) . On this interpretation, the proportion of total income in income constrained households π is given by ( ) 1 1 π β β − = , where the coefficient on the change in log income is 1 β and β is the speed of adjustment.
Given a speed of adjustment of 0.359 and 1 β estimated at 0.332 from Table 3 column 4, this suggests just over half of Japanese consumption comes from households who are, or behave as if they were, income constrained. This is not far from previous estimates of this proportion for Japan, see Hayashi (1997) . However, given the somewhat unsatisfactory micro foundations for the Campbell-Mankiw story, it is probably a mistake to interpret this too literally in terms of credit constraints (see by the ageing of the population and lengthening life-expectancy. Consumption or saving, conditional on such portfolio accumulations, is always less likely to be so sensitive to demographic structure.
US Results
Income Forecasting Equations
As for the UK, we estimate equations for DLYPERM (earlier called yperm log ∆ ), the deviation of log 'permanent' income from current log income,
LRYN, see equation (2.8). Income is real per capita non-property income as
constructed for the FRB-US model. 19 The same quarterly discount factor of 0.85 is adopted as for the UK and two models, 'naïve' and 'sophisticated' are estimated.
The basic idea behind the naïve model is that households tend to project into the future income growth experienced in the past four years, measured by D16LRYNMA, the 16 quarter change in the 4-quarter moving average of LRYN, but take other factors into account. Chief among these is CEXP, the Michigan Survey based measure of how confident households are about financial conditions in the next year. Another factor is the change in short term interest rates in the previous four quarters, D4TB3, a fall (monetary easing) should improve growth prospects. A further factor is D4LRPPIM, the 4-quarter change in the log ratio of PPI for raw materials, including energy, to finished goods: a rise typically leads to cash flow problems for companies and increases in prices of goods, which with sticky wages, leads to short term real income contraction.
The model for DLYPERM was obtained from a more general model also including changes in the unemployment rate and changes in the log real S&P500 index -but these had 'wrong' signs or were insignificant.
In contrast, a more sophisticated model assumes that households believe in trend-reversion of income in the long run and also are aware of a wider range of factors. Trends are captured by a linear trend, a split trend beginning in 1968, capturing a growth slowdown, and the log of labour productivity, LLPRODMA, the last two measured as 4-quarter moving averages. Equilibrium correction is captured by LRYN, with a highly significant negative coefficient. Thus, when LRYN is above trend, future growth will tend to be lower, other things being equal. There is also evidence that higher recent growth rates tend to be followed by lower growth, as reflected in negative coefficients on 4-quarter growth rates at t, t-4 and t-8.
As in the naïve model, the Michigan Survey expectations measure is strongly significant, and enters as a 4-quarter moving average, CEXPMA. Annual changes in the unemployment rate, D4UNR, have negative effects on income growth, entering both at t and at t-4. As in the naïve model, monetary policy, as measured by the 4-quarter change in the three month T Bill yield, enters significantly at lags t and t-4.
The 4-quarter change in the log relative price of raw materials is also relevant at t and at t-4.
Stock market prices have no significant forecasting power, however, probably because survey expectations already capture their effect. In the absence of a reliable long run of house price data, cyclical fluctuations in the housing market not already in the survey expectations measure are captured by housing starts scaled by population.
This enters as a 4-quarter moving average HOUSTCMA, lagged 4 quarters. It seems plausible that housing starts reflect optimism about the future and perhaps credit availability. Finally, as in the UK and Japan, there is some evidence of a 'Ricardian' effect in that large federal budget deficits tend to be followed by slower personal income growth. This is measured by a positive coefficient on the federal government surplus relative to GDP, entering as a 4-quarter moving average, RGFSURMA, lagged 4 quarters. 
Consumption Function Estimates for the US.
The first issue we address is the measurement of shifts in the credit supply function facing households. The closest US source for micro data on mortgage loanto-value (LTV, or its equivalent, downpayment to value) and on loan-to-income ratios Figure   7 ). While the index is tailored to consumer instalment credit rather than mortgage markets, it can serve as a first approximation to a more general credit conditions index.
We have estimated a sequence of models for the US of a similar form to the UK consumption functions shown in Table 2 . Table 4 , column 1 reports the simplest specification based on a simple extension of traditional life-cycle models with habits.
The dependent variable is the log change in real per capita consumption. The regressors include log y-log c -1 , the log change in real per capita non-property income (to reflect the possibility that some households simply spend income), our naïve and sophisticated proxies for permanent income relative to current income, and the ratio of end of previous quarter net worth to income. The estimated long-run MPC for net worth is 0.05, a plausible number, but the speed of adjustment is very low at 0.05 per quarter, while the role of current income growth is dominant. The residuals suffer from serious autocorrelation. Column 2 adds the change in the unemployment rate, the change in the nominal interest rate and the level of a real interest rate, as in the UK. The interest rate is the auto-finance rate which reflects special offers sometimes available to borrowers. The first two of these variables are highly significant, as in the UK and reduce some of the specification problems seen in column 1. Much of the interest rate effect may reflect that special auto sales finance programs induce large, short-term inter-temporal substitution.
In column 3, the credit conditions index is added and the three main assets are disaggregated into net liquid assets, housing wealth and illiquid financial assets, as for the UK. The credit conditions index is highly significant and the speed of adjustment increases dramatically to 0.27, suggesting a far better specified long-run solution.
The role of current income growth is now far reduced, while the weight on the sophisticated permanent income growth proxy is now positive (in contrast to columns 1 and 2). As far as the wealth effects are concerned, the data suggest that housing wealth has a far higher MPC than either net liquid assets or illiquid assets. On the surface, this is quite implausible since cash should be more spendable than housing assets, which, even if used as loan collateral rather than sold outright, are subject to the transactions costs of arranging loans.
One possibility is that short-run effects of higher housing wealth may be being confused with long-run effects. Another is that credit market liberalisation may have altered the spending power of housing wealth or collateral. Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, if the credit conditions index inadequately proxies shifts in credit availability to households, a downward bias in the coefficient on net liquid assets is likely to result. Since the early 1980s, RNLA1, the ratio of net liquid assets to income has fallen almost monotonically, in part, no doubt, under the influence of easier credit conditions. Since the latter has a positive effect on consumption, a downward bias on the coefficient on RNLA1 is likely.
Column 4 explores the role of housing wealth dynamics and interaction effects, beginning from more general dynamic specifications. It suggests that the acceleration of the housing wealth to income ratio is relevant as well as the level. The interaction of the 4-quarter change in housing wealth with the credit conditions proxy appears with a t-ratio of 1.6. However, the interaction of the housing wealth/income ratio with the credit conditions proxy is quite insignificant, t=0.3. All of these complications only marginally reduce the long-run MPC of housing wealth or collateral, however. In all specifications the interaction of the income growth expectations term with the US CCI is insignificant.
To provide prima facie evidence on the hypothesis that the credit conditions proxy may be inadequate, the same model was estimated using a stochastic trend in place of US CCI, in the STAMP software, see Koopman et al. (2006) . The results are shown in column 5. The speed of adjustment rises sharply to 0.507, while the long-run MPCs are now far more plausible. They are 0.072 for net liquid assets, and 0.018 for illiquid financial assets (in which illiquid pension wealth has a large weight).
For housing wealth or collateral, only the interaction effect with credit conditions now matters giving an MPC of 0.055 for housing collateral at the very peak of credit availability, but normally rather less. The dynamic effects are still present with t-ratios of 1.6 and 1.7 respectively 20 . Current income growth is now insignificant, while the model puts a larger weight on the sophisticated permanent income proxy. A standard criticism of time series estimates of solved out consumption functions is that there are many slowly moving, correlated factors that could be affecting consumption. These include demographic trends, evolutionary changes in the inequality of income and wealth and changes in social security and pensions systems, cohort-specific evolutionary shifts in attitudes in time preferences and risk, as well as long-term shifts in credit conditions. We cannot exclude the possibility that the estimated stochastic trend reflects some of these factors as well as shifts in credit market architecture.
--- Table 4 About Here ---A range of alternative specifications, with and without the stochastic trend, are all consistent with the view that the marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth in recent years has substantially exceeded that out of illiquid financial wealth.
This supports the claim by Case et al. (2005) that the housing wealth (or collateral) effect in the US exceeds the stock market wealth effect. These results are also consistent with Benjamin et al (2004) and with Carroll et al. (2006) . As noted above, the latter separate assets into two kinds, broadly illiquid financial wealth and the rest, largely net liquid assets plus housing wealth.
In the UK, the marginal propensity to consume for net liquid assets is relatively accurately estimated at 0.11, and the US estimate of 0.072 in Table 4 , column 5 is only around one standard error away from this value, broadly consistent with the microeconomic evidence from Gross and Souleles (2002) . However, the marginal propensity to consume for housing collateral in the UK in recent years is close to 0.032 while most values estimated for the US, as well as ours, are substantially higher. Our most plausible estimate of 0.055 has a substantial margin of uncertainty around it. One can ask whether it is plausible that the US figure could be twice or more that for housing in the UK. Transactions costs are broadly similar: the higher fees of US real estate agents being offset in the UK by higher transactions tax rates (Stamp Duty).
However, the US differs from the UK in three major ways. The first is that mortgage interest, even on second homes, is fully tax deductible in the US, while the UK, after heavily capping tax deductibility for many years, gradually eliminated it.
This creates a relative incentive in the US for loading as much debt as possible on home equity. The second major difference is that the fixed rate mortgage system is highly effective in protecting US households from interest rate risk on both mortgage debt that finances housing and that used to finance non-housing consumption via "cash-out" mortgage refinancing. The U.S. system protects households from rising rates and gives them a low cost option to refinance when rates drop. The view that there was an implicit government guarantee underwriting Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and the existence of a deep financial system permitting prepayment risk to be hedged effectively through the government bond market and elsewhere, explain the low cost of this option, see Green and Wachter (2007) . In contrast, as Miles (2004) makes clear, the high penalty charges for refinancing in the UK have discouraged demand for fixed rate mortgages. Thirdly, in most US states there is a 'walk away' option for households with negative housing equity: they can simply hand in the keys to their home to the mortgage lender and be free of further debt service obligations.
In the UK, in contrast, borrowers can be pursued for seven years for any debt not covered by the sale of their repossessed home. Together, the tax and risk advantages of US mortgages make it plausible that the marginal propensity to consume for home equity should be significantly larger in the US than in the UK.
Our aim in future work is to sharpen the US estimate with more accurate estimates of a credit conditions index using the multiple indicator, common factor approach with a set of credit related equations. The policy relevance of such estimates is clearly high. Currently, both a contraction in credit availability and a fall in housing collateral are constraining US consumer spending. Our model, which also includes stock market wealth effects and the change in the unemployment rate throws a great deal of light on the short to medium term outlook for US consumer spending.
Concluding comments
Credit constraints can have important theoretical implications for consumer spending that are borne out in our empirical findings for the UK, U.S. and Japan. We find that the evolution of credit availability can differ across countries and may change over time within countries. In Japan, the consumption function has been very stable, reflecting a lack of financial liberalization since the 1970s. Consistent with theory, the absence of major changes easing the availability of finance to households, and differences in the tax code, likely accounts for why rising home prices tend to restrain consumption in Japan.
In contrast, there have been very large changes in the availability of credit in the UK and the U.S. over the last few decades. Greater access to credit has resulted in an upward shift of the consumption function in both countries, as reflected in consumption coefficients on credit conditions indexes for each nation. Furthermore, financial liberalization is linked to a positive impact of housing wealth on consumption that has become more enhanced in both countries over time and to changes in some other consumption coefficients.
As a result, the impact of large, recent declines in wealth, particularly housing equity, will likely have larger dampening effects on consumer spending in the UK and the U.S. for some time. Of course, some of the swings in housing wealth reflect the impact of changes in mortgage credit standards as shown in some of our other work in progress (Duca et al., 2008) . These negative wealth effects are being compounded by a related and substantial tightening of consumer credit standards in the U.S., a combination not seen since 1974-75, when consumption was unusually weak. In both instances, the availability of mortgages fell sharply, reflecting the recent collapse of subprime mortgage lending and the disintermediation that deposit rate regulations induced in the mid-1970s. Although energy prices have recently declined in stark contrast to that earlier episode, consumer credit availability has plunged more in the recent episode. Moreover, much of the recent credit tightening reflects the effects of loan losses that will likely persist for some time, rather than the Regulation Q effects of the mid-1970s that quickly unwound when interest rates fell. In the UK, there are also indications that the availability of credit has been sharply curtailed in recent quarters amid very sizable declines in house and other asset prices.
Although Japanese consumer spending will likely be less directly affected by declines in housing wealth and credit availability in Japan, the impact of the global economic downturn, particularly in the U.S., is affecting Japanese household income via a slowdown in net exports. As others have demonstrated (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin, 2008) , the damage that loan losses are causing to financial institutions is also large enough to induce credit tightening outside of the U.S. Hence, the unwinding of the Anglo-American credit-fuelled consumption boom is impacting the world economy via lowering net exports and raising financial frictions.
Nevertheless, it is important to make cross-country and time series distinctions regarding the nature of the current credit crisis and its impact on the world economy. Note: asset to income ratios are defined as end of last quarter assets/4 (current quarterly non-property income). Explanatory variables are scaled by the estimated coefficients in the long-run solution. See footnote to Table 1 for the definition of the interaction between CCI and housing wealth/income. 
Appendix: Constructing a U.S. Credit Conditions Index
Before constructing a levels index from this relative change index, we first adjust it for identifiable effects of interest rates and the macroeconomic outlook by estimating an empirical model based on screening models. In such models (see Duca and Garrett, 1995 ; and the screening model of Stiglitz and Weiss, part IV, 1981) , credit standards should be tightened when the real riskless rate rises and the macroeconomic outlook worsens. (Since the willingness to lend index is inversely related to credit standards, these expected signs are reversed in our empirical model of the diffusion index.) we track the former by including the t and t-1 lags of the first difference of the real federal funds rate ( RFF, the nominal funds rate minus the yearover-year percent change in the overall PCE deflator), and the latter by the twoquarter percent change in the index of leading economic indicators ( LEI2). To further adjust for factors affecting consumer loan quality, we include the time t yearover-year change in the delinquency rate on all consumer instalment loans at banks ( 4DEL, American Bankers Association). Also included were two variables to control for the impact of regulation. One was a dummy equal to 1 in 1980:q2 when credit controls were imposed and equal to -1 when they were lifted in 1980:q3 (DCON). The second is a variable (REGQ) consistently measuring the degree to which Regulation Q ceilings impinged upon banks' ability to raise small time deposit rates (see Duca, 1996; and Duca and Wu, forthcoming) and thereby raised banks' shadow cost of raising loanable funds (Regulation Q was binding during an era before the loan sales and mortgage-backed securities markets were deep). After Reg Q was lifted, the interbank funding market increasingly became a marginal source of loanable funds, with the three-month LIBOR normally exceeding the expected 3-month average federal funds rate by about 10-12 basis points. However, as out-sized fears of bank portfolio losses and liquidity premiums soared during the current financial crisis, so did these spreads, which raised one marginal cost of funding loans.
To control for this, we include the t and t-1 spreads between the 3-month LIBOR and 3-month OIS rates (LIBOR3).
Estimating the model with an AR (1) where t-statistics are in parentheses, R 2 = 0.798, standard error = 9.06, LM(2) = 0.69, and Q(24) = 17.49. The coefficients all have the anticipated signs and are all significant, with the exception of the t-1 lag of LIBOR3, which, however, is jointly significant with its time t lag. We then subtracted the estimated impact of changes in the real federal funds rate, leading economic indicators, and delinquency rate to remove normal business cycle and interest rate effects, leaving the impact of regulations, unusual credit frictions in the LIBOR market, and unexplained movements in the adjusted diffusion index (CRAdj). We transformed CRAdj into a levels CCI based on the .01 positive and statistically significant correlation of the CR index with the growth rate of real per capita consumer loan extensions (available 1966-1982:q4) . Setting 1966:q2 = 100 and using this correlation, we then allowed the CCI to multiplicatively evolve according to CCI t = CCI t-1 *(1+(.01)*CRAdj). The multiplicative aggregation is consistent with the senior loan officer question asking whether a bank's willingness to make consumer loans was much more, somewhat more, unchanged, somewhat less, or much less compared to three months earlier.
The resulting CCI rises greatly during the 1980s, and then rises over 2004-06, before reversing the gains of the early decade since 2006.
